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Deference and Democracy
Lisa Schultz Bressman*
Abstract
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984), the Supreme Court famously held that judicial deference to agency interpretationsof ambiguous statutes is appropriatelargely because the executive branch is politically accountablefor those policy choices.
In recent cases, the Court has not displayed unwavering commitment to this
decision or its principle of political accountability. This Article explores two
cases, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), and
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), in which the administrationspossessed strong claims of accountabilityyet the Court did not defer to the agency
determinations. In both, the Court justified its refusal of deference by contending that the questions were too extraordinaryfor Congress implicitly to
have delegated. This Article argues that these cases might be better understood to reflect a judgment not about whether Congress had delegated interpretive authority, but about how each administration had exercised its
authority. Both administrations,though accountablein a general sense, acted
undemocratically when viewed in the particularcontext of these cases. The
agencies used broad delegations in ways potentially insensitive to congressional or popular interests on controversial issues and inconsistent with the
obligations of the executive branch within the government. The Court determined that the conditions for judicial deference were not met. Thus, these
cases reflect an approach that, while inconsistent with conventional notions of
political accountability, is nevertheless principled and defensible. The Article
shows that this approach is reflected in other cases, although not many. This
infrequency does not diminish the importance of the message that the cases
send to the executive branch. It does, however, illuminate important limits:
ordinarily, administrationsdo not raise alarms, and political accountability is
sufficient for judicial deference. An examination of the cases demonstrates
that the Court is aware of the danger that it might invalidate agency interpretations based simply on the Justices' own ideology or politics and that the Court
has taken steps to curb such judicial overreaching.
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Introduction

Administrative law scholars often have assumed that judicial deference to agency determinations rests on the political accountability
of the executive branch., Recent Supreme Court cases have suggested
that the relationship between deference and democracy is more com-

plicated than we have thought. The conventional view of deference is
reflected in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 Famously, Chevron established a two-step test for determin-

ing whether (and when) judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations is appropriate. 3 Step One considers whether Congress

has spoken to the precise issue; Step Two takes statutory ambiguity as
an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the agency, commanding judicial deference to agency interpretations as long as they

are "reasonable." ' 4 The second step premises judicial deference not
only on the intent of Congress in allocating interpretive authority, but
also on the relative expertise and political accountability of agencies

6
in exercising such authority. 5 Scholars have widely endorsed Chevron

and especially the principle of political accountability on which it
rests: "While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
7
branch of government to make such policy choices."

In recent cases, however, the Court has not displayed unwavering
commitment to the Chevron decision or its principle. For example, in
United States v. Mead Corp.,8 the Court carved out an exception to
Chevron's scheme, which Cass Sunstein has dubbed Chevron Step
Zero. 9 Specifically, the Court held that an agency is not entitled to

judicial deference when interpreting statutory ambiguities unless there
I See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2373-74
(2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 102-03 (1994); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1256
(1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006).
2 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id. at 842-43.
4 Id. (articulating the test); id. at 844 (using the word "reasonable").
5 Id. at 865.
6 See sources at supra note 1.
7

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.

8 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001).

9 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (describing Step
Zero as "the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all").
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is evidence that Congress has delegated, and the agency has exercised,
authority to act with the force of law, as evidenced by procedures like
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 10 Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that deference was appropriate as long as the
interpretation was the authoritative view of the agency, regardless of
whether it was the product of any particular procedure, because the
executive branch is accountable for such interpretations.1 But, based
on the majority's view, the electoral accountability of the President
and his administration was not a sufficient basis for judicial deference.
The Court has carved another exception out of Chevron's
scheme, further evidencing its view that executive branch accountability is insufficient to justify judicial deference to agency interpretations
in some circumstances. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,12 the Court held that the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") was not entitled to judicial deference with respect to its interpretation extending the reach of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act ("FDCA") to tobacco products. 13 The Court refused to presume
that Congress would have delegated "a decision of such economic and
political significance ... in so cryptic a fashion.' 4 Recently, in Gonzales v. Oregon,15 the Court similarly held that the Attorney General
was not entitled to judicial deference regarding an interpretation extending the reach of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") to physician-assisted suicide.16 The Court refused to presume that Congress
would have implicitly authorized the Attorney General to reach an
issue as "extraordinary" as the restriction of physician-assisted sui-

10 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
11 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is no necessary connection between the formality of
procedure and the power of the entity administering the procedure to resolve authoritatively
questions of law."); see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 234 ("The Court's approach, when measured against the values of accountability and discipline, denies deference to actions that have earned it and gives deference to
actions that do not deserve it.").
12 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
13

Id. at 161.

Id. at 160. The Court decided Brown & Williamson during the same Term as Christensen v. Harris County, in which the Court anticipated Mead. See Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.").
14

15 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
16 Id. at 925.
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cide. 17 Congress, the Court said, does not "hide elephants in
' '18

mouseholes.
This Article seeks to reconcile the Chevron framework with
Brown & Williamson and Gonzales. It argues that the Court withheld
deference because the respective administrations-agency heads, key

White House officials, or even the President himself-although
electorally accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways
that were undemocratic when viewed in the larger legal and social
contexts. In Brown & Williamson, the administration had used the
FDCA to take an action that the current Congress likely opposed. 19
In Gonzales, the administration had used the CSA to take a position
on an issue that the people actively were debating, without involving
or ascertaining the views of the public. 20 Under these circumstances,
the Court was not prepared to conclude that the executive branch had
met the conditions for judicial deference. Political accountability was
not functioning as an adequate check on the administrations' con-

duct.21 Counterintuitively, the Court needed to intervene to ensure
accountability, or at least the promise of representative and respon22
sive government for which accountability stands.
See id. at 918.
Id. at 921 (quotation omitted).
19 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60.
20 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 921.
21 This Article shares the sympathies of two short pieces that appeared as this Article was
in its final stages. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and
Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship,115 YALE L.J. 2623 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, Within Marbury:
The Importance of Judicial Limits on the Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 116 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 59 (2006). Professors Eskridge and Schwartz defend the result in Gonzales,
arguing that administrations may not take positions that prevent decision making by "more qualified agencies and even by the democratic process itself." Eskridge & Schwartz, supra, at 2628,
2632. The authors view this case against a particular normative backdrop: agencies should undertake debate on social issues, and administrations should not disrupt debate or shift debate from its proper forum. See id. at 2625-27.
Professor Strauss argues that Gonzales is correct because it ensures that "someone other
than the executive tend[s] the fence around executive authority and take[s] care that the authority is exercised in a manner subject to public participation and control." Strauss, supra, at 62.
He argues that Brown & Williamson is correct because it preserves a role for judicial review and
"the restraint it can offer against shorter-term political departures from our culture of legality."
Id. at 67. Professor Strauss contends that Congress was unlikely to have delegated the power
that the agency asserted, and that the case functions as a "nondelegation canon[ ]," requiring
"fresh congressional authority" for cigarette restrictions. Id. at 62, 67.
22 The Court has examined so-called extraordinary questions in other cases that do not
involve the particular political problem that, this Article argues, Brown & Williamson and Gonzales present. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,468 (2001) ("[W]e find it
implausible that Congress would give to EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards."); MCI
17
18
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The heart of my explanation is that these cases are best understood to tell administrations that they may not disregard larger governmental or public interests and still expect to command judicial
deference. The cases do not suggest that an administration may act
only after aggregating congressional or popular preferences. Rather,
an administration may not issue a rule knowing that Congress opposes
its substance and would need supermajority support to reverse it, assuming a presidential veto. Moreover, an administration may not resolve a politically charged issue essentially by fiat, knowing that the
people presently are engaged in active debate.
A difficult question that arises from this framework is determining how to relate this complicated and aggressive judicial stance to
notions of congressional intent. We might adopt the Court's approach-Congress does not lightly delegate extraordinary questionsonce we understand precisely what makes those questions extraordinary. Or we might look for a different explanation; perhaps Congress
intends agencies either to interpret some statutes in light of current
congressional preferences or even to refrain from taking positions on
issues that are the subject of current debate. That way, Congress itself
may participate in any federal resolution or prevent sudden changes
on important issues.
My preference is simply to acknowledge that Chevron is based on
a fiction about congressional intent in the service of broader democratic values, perhaps more than we previously may have thought.
Furthermore, if we accept this position, we might begin to see that it
matters little whether we classify the cases as Chevron Step Zero or
Step One or Step Two. We might understand both Brown & Williamson and Gonzales not only to impose as a condition of deference that
an agency possesses delegated authority, but also that the agency exercises such authority in a democratically reasonable fashion. In this
regard, the cases may contain important lessons about the meaning of
Chevron itself.
Although this story of the relationship between deference and democracy is different from the ones that others have told, I contend
that it better explains the cases. Furthermore, this analysis ties Brown
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) ("It is highly unlikely that
Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion-and even more unlikely that it would achieve that
through such a subtle devise as permission to 'modify' rate-filing requirements."). This Article
does not purport to address all extraordinary or jurisdictional question cases. Importantly, the
Article suggests that such cases, despite common language, might yield different explanations for
their holdings that are consistent with a multitextured view of the Chevron framework.
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& Williamson and Gonzales to previous decisions in which the Court
exhibited similar attention to how the administration acted in interpreting a broad statute. But such cases are few, which reveals that the
Court will not take this approach lightly. Thus, interpreting the cases
together helps us understand the approach and its limits. Ordinarily,
administrations do not act in a fashion that raises cause for concern.
Only rarely will the Court find that political accountability is insufficient for judicial deference. That does not diminish the importance of
the message to the executive branch that the cases convey. Rather, it
shows that the Court is not out of control in telling agencies that in
this particular context they have gone too far. Indeed, if we believe
that agencies generally should control regulatory policy unless Congress has spoken to the precise issue, then any model of statutory con23
struction must contain constraints on judicial maneuvering.
In addition to applying in relatively few cases, the approach is
limited in a more specific sense. An examination of the cases demonstrates that the Court is concerned not to invalidate agency interpretations simply on the basis of the Justices' own ideology or politics. The
alignment of the Justices, however, seems to suggest otherwise. The
conservatives voted to invalidate the Clinton administration's policy,
and the liberals voted to invalidate the Bush administration's policy,
with only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy voting with the majority in
both cases. 24 But, as the cases themselves show, the Court-prompted
perhaps by the concerns of the median Justices-actually has taken
steps that allay the fear that it might be unprincipled in the application
of this particular exception to Chevron's framework: the Court has
demanded a concrete indication that the administration has acted essentially by fiat, either by disregarding known congressional preferences or acting without public process on a matter of public debate.
Now that Justice O'Connor has left the Court, it is important to take
seriously these limits if the Court cares to immunize itself against
charges of ideology in future cases.

23 Of course, Chevron itself always has provided courts with latitude to invalidate interpretations with which the judges disagree, and not only through the recently announced exceptions.
Justice Scalia conceded long ago that he may find clarity in almost any ambiguous language.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text
and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement
for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.").
24 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 910; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 123.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Brown &
Williamson and Gonzales. Part II argues that those cases reflect a certain model of statutory construction, which is best understood as related to the administration's failure to exercise its authority in a
democratic fashion. Part III identifies the theory in other cases. Finally, Part IV describes limitations that cabin this model of statutory
construction and inhibit courts from depriving administrations of interpretive control on an ad hoc basis.
I.

The Cases

This Part describes Brown & Williamson and Gonzales in some
detail to set the stage for a discussion of the model of statutory construction that the cases reflect. It begins by describing the case from
which they apparently depart: Chevron.
A.

Chevron

In Chevron, the Court accorded deference to an agency interpretation in large part because the agency had relied on the administration's views.25 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had
switched its interpretation of "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act
from an individual smokestack to a plant-wide or "bubble" concept at
the behest of the newly elected Reagan administration. 26 Under the
new definition, a firm could modify or add individual smokestacks
within a plant and not trigger the stringent permitting requirements of
the statute as long as the additional smokestacks did not increase
emissions from that plant as a whole.27 Thus, the definition introduced an "emissions trading" system, under which firms could deter28
mine the lowest-cost method to meet established pollution limits.
The new interpretation thereby provided pollution-reduction incentives for existing sources rather than pollution-reduction mandates for
new ones.
The Court deferred to EPA's change, articulating the now famous
29
two-step test for evaluating an agency's statutory interpretation.
Finding the statute ambiguous in the relevant respect, the Court deChevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
Id. at 857-59.
27 Id.
28 See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis
of EPA's Emissions Trading Program,6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109 (1989); R. Liroff, Reforming
Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA's Bubble, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 388, 388 (Peter S. Menell & Richard Stewart eds., 1994).
29 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
25

26
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ferred to the agency's new definition. 30 The Court stated that reliance
on the administration's views was a principal factor supporting judicial
deference:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
31
light of everyday realities.
Chevron, of course, sets the gold standard for judicial deference
to all agency interpretations, not just those that clearly rely on the
administration's views. But Chevron makes clear that such interpretations deserve special solicitude because, in addition to satisfying the
general conditions for judicial deference, they promote political
32
accountability.
B.

Brown & Williamson

The Court has not always followed Chevron and deferred to
agency interpretations that rely on the administration's views. In
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court invalidated
such an interpretation. 33 At the behest of the Clinton administration,
the FDA had interpreted the FDCA to confer jurisdiction over tobacco products. 34 The FDA argued that tobacco is a "drug" within the
meaning of the FDCA because it "affect[s] the structure or [a] function of the body," and that cigarettes are "combination products" for
the delivery of those effects. 35 Specifically, the nicotine in cigarettes
"exerts psychoactive, or mood-altering, effects on the brain that cause
and sustain addiction, have both tranquilizing and stimulating effects,
30

Id. at 845.

31

Id. at 865-66.
Id. at 865.

32

33 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. Id. at 123.
34 Id. at 127.
35

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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and control weight. '36 Furthermore, the FDA found that such effects
were "intended," as the statute requires, because the effects "are so
widely known and foreseeable that [they] may be deemed to have
been intended by the manufacturers," and the "actions of manufacturers revealed that they have 'designed' cigarettes to provide pharmacologically active doses of nicotine to consumers. '37 Thus, the FDA
claimed that it had authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco
38
products.
After deciding that it had jurisdiction over tobacco products, the
FDA then defended its policy decision to restrict the sale and distribution of cigarettes to children and adolescents. 39 Because most people
start smoking and become addicted at a young age, the FDA argued
that the best way to prevent the adverse health effects associated with
tobacco products was to prevent children and adolescents from ever
using them. 40 Thus, the FDA promulgated regulations that, for example, prohibited "the sale of cigarettes in quantities smaller than 20,"
"sales through self-service displays and vending machines except in
adult-only locations," "outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of any
public playground or school," and "the distribution of promotional
items, such as T-shirts or hats, bearing the manufacturer's brand
41
name."
The Court invalidated the regulations, finding that the statute was
clear and precluded FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products. 42 The
majority began its analysis by noting that the FDCA envisions the ban
of unsafe products from the market. 43 Although the FDA produced
evidence that cigarettes were unsafe, a statute enacted after the
FDCA protected the continued marketing of tobacco and therefore
precluded the FDA from fully banning cigarettes.- Moreover, Congress had enacted six additional specific statutes since the FDCA,
none of which authorized a ban on cigarettes or FDA jurisdiction over
such products. 45 Rather, the statutes authorized other agencies to
36

Id. (quotation omitted).

37

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

38

40

Id. at 127-28.
Id.

41

Id. (quotation omitted).

42

Id. at 160-61.

43

Id. at 137.

44

Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)).

45

Id. at 137-38 (collecting statutes).

39
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take more modest steps, regulating the labeling and advertising of to46
bacco products.
The Court then considered in detail the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress had enacted since the FDCA, recognizing that a
statute "may have a range of plausible meanings" that will take shape
over time through subsequent statutes. 47 Congress had adopted the
subsequent statutes "against the backdrop of the FDA's consistent
and repeated statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA to
regulate tobacco absent claims of therapeutic benefit by the manufacturer. '4 8 Furthermore, during this time and "after the health consequences of tobacco use and nicotine's pharmacological effect had
become well known," Congress had "considered and rejected bills
that would have granted the FDA such jurisdiction. ' 49 This was not
an instance of "simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents its acquiescence in an agency's position." 50 Rather, the Court
found that "Congress's tobacco-specific legislation has effectively ratified the FDA's previous position that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products ' 51 and "created a distinct regulatory scheme addressing the subject of tobacco and health ' 52 that plainly excludes
"any administrative agency in making policy on the subject of tobacco
and health. '53 The Court concluded that "[it is therefore clear, based
on the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and the subsequent tobacco
legislation, that Congress has directly spoken to the question at issue
54
and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco products.
Finally, the Court noted that this was the sort of case in which it
should hesitate before concluding that Congress implicitly delegated
authority to the agency. 55 Specifically, "the FDA has now asserted
jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of
46 Id. at 137-39. The Court found that the FDA could not argue in the alternative that
tobacco products are "safe" and fit to remain on the market. Id. at 139-40. The FDA had
argued that a ban would be "dangerous" for those who already were addicted and who therefore
would suffer extreme withdrawal. Id. at 139. But, the Court said, the statute requires a particular determination of "safety"-namely, that therapeutic benefits of cigarettes outweigh the
health risks. Id. at 140. The FDA did not and could not make this determination precisely
because it had determined that cigarettes have no therapeutic benefits. Id.
47 Id. at 143.
48 Id. at 144.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 155.
51 Id. at 157.
52 Id. at 156.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 160-61.
55 See id. at 159.
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the American economy."5 6 Tobacco "has its own unique place in political history. ' 57 Given this fact, the Court was confident that "Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion. ' 58 Thus,
the Court concluded that "no matter how important, conspicuous, and
controversial the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to
hold the Executive Branch politically accountable, an administrative
agency's power to regulate in the public interest must always be
'59
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.
Justice Breyer dissented, essentially on the same political accountability grounds that underpinned Justice Scalia's dissent in
Mead.60 After taking issue with the majority's technical points, 61 he
contended that that the Court had no reason to withhold deference
based on the "magnitude" of the question: "Insofar as the decision to
regulate tobacco reflects the policy of an administration, it is a decision for which that administration, and those politically elected officials who support it, must (and will) take responsibility. ' 62 Indeed,
"the very importance of the decision taken here, as well as its attendant publicity" facilitates political accountability. 63 Therefore, Justice
Breyer believed that such accountability was sufficient for judicial deference to the FDA's interpretation here. 64
C. Gonzales
In Gonzales v. Oregon,65 the Court also rejected an agency interpretation even though the agency had relied on the administration's
56

Id.

57

Id.
Id. at 160.

58
59
60

Id. at 161 (quotation omitted).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and

Ginsburg. Id.; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
61 Justice Breyer argued that cigarettes fit within the FDCA. Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting). First, he contended that cigarettes have pharmacological
effects that manufacturers "intend." Id. at 162. Second, Justice Breyer noted that the regulation
of cigarettes advances the basic purpose of the statute: to protect public health. Id. Finally, he
argued that subsequently enacted statutes could not impeach this interpretation because the
statutes are neither inconsistent with FDA jurisdiction nor a reliable indication of what Congress
may have intended when passing the FDCA. See id. at 182.
62

Id. at 190.

63

Id.
See id. at 190-91.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, joined

64
65

by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 910.
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views. Under President George W. Bush's administration, Attorney
General John Ashcroft interpreted the CSA to confer jurisdiction
over physician-assisted suicide in the wake of an Oregon law that legalized physician-assisted suicide under certain conditions. 66 Without
opportunity for public notice or comment-indeed "without consulting Oregon or apparently anyone outside his Department" 67-the Attorney General determined that physician-assisted suicide was "not a
'legitimate medical purpose"' for which physicians might dispense and
prescribe controlled substances under the CSA and accompanying Attorney General regulations. 68 As a result, physicians would violate the
CSA and its regulations by dispensing and prescribing controlled substances to assist a person to commit suicide, jeopardizing doctors' federal registrations to prescribe controlled substances for other
purposes.69 Furthermore, physicians would be vulnerable to these
consequences "regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits
'70
such conduct.
The Court invalidated the Attorney General's interpretation of
the CSA. 71 The majority first considered whether the Interpretive
Ruling construed a separate regulation rather than the statute itself
72
and therefore came within the deference test of Auer v. Robbins.
The Court found that the Attorney General's Interpretive Ruling construed a regulation that merely parroted the statute, thus effectively
construing the statute itself. 73 As a result, the Court stated that Chev74
ron provided the proper starting place.
Turning to a Chevron analysis, the Court acknowledged that the
language of the CSA was ambiguous. 75 Nevertheless, the Court refused to presume that Congress implicitly would authorize the executive branch to resolve such an "extraordinary" question by
66 Id. at 913; see Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2005).
67 Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 913 (quotation omitted).
68 Id. at 913-14 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2005)).
69

Id.

70 Id. at 914.

Id.at 922.
72 Id.;
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997) (holding that the Court must defer to
a Secretary's interpretation of an agency's own regulations unless the interpretation is "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation").
73 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915-16.
74 Id. at 916; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
75 Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 916 ("All would agree, we should think, that the statutory phrase
'legitimate medical purpose' is a generality, susceptible to more precise definition and open to
varying constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant sense.").
71
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criminalizing an act that is legal under state law. 76 Indeed, the Attorney General did not have broad rulemaking power to enforce all the
provisions of the statute. 77 Nor did the Attorney General assert authority that related to his limited powers concerning "the registration
and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances. ' 78 Rather, the Attorney General unilaterally
claimed authority to determine what constitutes a legitimate medical
79
practice, which is an issue generally outside his area of expertise.
The Court noted that granting an agency's interpretation Chevron deference reflects a presumption that Congress tends to delegate in accordance with a determination that a particular agency possesses
"historical familiarity and policymaking expertise."' ' o
Moreover, the Court cited Brown & Williamson to support its decision and observed that Congress does not tend to "'hide elephants
in mouseholes."'81 The Court then considered subsequent legislative
history, bolstering its conclusion against congressional delegation in
much the same way as it had in Brown & Williamson.82 The Court
stated that "[p]ost enactment congressional commentary on the CSA's
regulation of medical practice is also at odds with the Attorney General's claimed authority. ' 83 As the Court noted, "'Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.' 84 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which
has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across the
country, makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the
more suspect. ' 85 The logical result of a decision upholding the new
regulation on the ground of deference, the Court reasoned, would be
a conferral to the Attorney General of carte blanche power to pro86
hibit any controversial treatment.
The Court refused to decide whether the Attorney General could
ever use an Interpretive Ruling and expect to command judicial defer76

Id. at 916, 918.

77

Id. at 917.
21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000 & Supp. 2005).

78

Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 921.
Id. (quotation omitted).
81 Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
82 Id. at 920-21.
83 Id. at 920.
84 Id. at 911 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).
85 Id. at 921 (quotation omitted).
86 Id. at 921-22.
79
80
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ence under Chevron. 7 Thus, the Court did not reach the Mead issue:
whether an Interpretative Ruling might carry "the force of law" in
other contexts, such as the Attorney General's resolution of a less important question. 8 Instead, the Court held that this particular question simply was too significant for the Attorney General to resolve
through an Interpretive Ruling.8 9 In this way, the Court linked the
magnitude of the question with the force-of-law determination, suggesting that significant questions may only be resolved in formats that
more clearly carry the force of law.
The Court also considered whether the Attorney General's reading of the statute nevertheless was "persuasive" under the standard
for judicial deference outlined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 90 concluding that it was not. 91 The Court noted that the CSA "presupposed"
statutes just like Oregon's. 92 At the same time, the CSA directs any
medical judgments to the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
not the Attorney General. 93 In light of these facts, the Court refused
to presume that "the prescription requirement delegates to a single
Executive officer the power to effect a radical shift of authority from
the States to the Federal Government to define general standards of
' '94
medical practice in every locality.
Justice Scalia dissented. 95 Although his argument did not reference political accountability, that was the effect: the interpretation
was valid because the executive branch authoritatively chose it. Justice Scalia argued that the Attorney General plainly has the authority
to regulate prescriptions, 96 and therefore also has the power to determine that "the dispensation of a Schedule II substance for the purpose
of assisting a suicide is not a 'prescription' within the meaning of [the
statute]" 97 because the act of assisting suicide is not a "legitimate med87

Id. at 922.

88 Id.

89 Id. at 921-22.
90 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that a Court should follow
an agency's rule if the agency can persuade the Court that it is the best interpretation).
91 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 922-25.
92 Id. at 923.
93 Id. at 924.
94 Id. at 925.
95 Id. at 926-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas. Id. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent, arguing that the Court was
bound by its decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), to conclude that the CSA sweeps
broadly into areas of traditional state control. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 939-41 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
96 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 931.
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ical practice" or otherwise within the public interest. 98 Justice Scalia

noted that the Attorney General may further determine that any physician who writes illegitimate prescriptions "may 'render his registration. . . inconsistent with the public interest' and therefore subject to
possible suspension [under the statute]." 99 This conclusion follows,
Justice Scalia believed, whether the Interpretive Ruling is entitled to
any deference or no deference, because it is "the most reasonable"
reading of the statute. 0 0 Thus, Justice Scalia took the view that as
long as the interpretation is not precluded by the statute, the Attorney
General is entitled to adopt it, even without any outside consultations
or formal process. 101
II. A PrincipledApproach
Scholars have argued that the opinion in Brown & Williamson is

incorrect because it reflects an approach to statutory construction that
deprives the executive branch of control over regulatory policy without countervailing justification, and these scholars might also reject
the decision in Gonzales for the same reason. 0 2 The argument would
be that the cases fail to remit certain interpretive questions-indeed, a
potentially boundless category of questions-to agencies, even though
the agencies are more accountable than courts. These scholars would
assert that political accountability is a sufficient basis for judicial
deference.
98

103

Id. at 931-33.

99 Id. at 931 (first alteration in original, emphasis added) (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)).
100 Id. Justice Scalia contended that the notion that Congress does not "hide elephants in
mouseholes" has no relevance here because it applies only to interpretations that undermine the
central features of the regulatory scheme, whereas this interpretation enhances the Attorney
General's ability to address drug abuse. Id. He also underscored that the Court's decision did
not render Chevron inapplicable due to the format of the ruling or the absence of notice-andcomment procedures. Id. at 929.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 9, at 193-94 (arguing that Brown &
Williamson increases "uncertainty and judicial policymaking without promoting important countervailing values" and that it should yield to a rule that gives "policymaking authority to institutions that are likely to have the virtues of specialized competence and political accountability").
103 This Article brackets wholesale objections to Chevron premised either on separation of
powers or institutional considerations. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989) (expressing
separation of powers concerns); Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule,
116 YALE L.J. 676, 679 (2006) (arguing that Chevron should operate as a voting rule, requiring a
majority of justices or judges to uphold an interpretation, rather than one that requires courts to
assess the reasonableness of agency interpretations).
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The cases, of course, suggest otherwise. This Part offers an expla-

nation for the Court's rejection of deference in these cases. It first
considers the Court's stated reason uniting the cases-that some questions are too extraordinary to presume that Congress intended the
agency to resolve them. 0 4 This Part then argues that further information is necessary to understand what made the particular questions so
extraordinary. That information, this Part continues, leads to a particular understanding of why the Court withheld deference. The administrations used broad statutes in an undemocratic fashion to take an
action on a controversial issue that disregarded the likely preferences
of Congress or to take a position on an issue subject to public debate

without conducting any public process of its own.
A.

The Problem of "Extraordinary" Questions

Brown & Williamson and Gonzales are very different cases. In
the former, the Court held that Congress had directly spoken to the

issue; 10 5 in the latter, the Court found that the statute was ambiguous. 10 6 In the former, the agency had used notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures;' 0 7 in the latter, the agency had used an essentially procedure-less Interpretive Ruling. 10 8 Nevertheless, the cases
have a common thread: in both, the Court rejected the interpretations
because the questions were too important to support an implicit delegation of interpretive authority. 10 9 The Court thus prevented the ad-

ministrations from asserting authority over significant issues absent an
express delegation. 10
Some scholars have described the Court's approach in Brown &
Williamson as reinforcing a nondelegation principle.'11 Specifically,
104 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 921-22; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 160 (2001).
105 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.
106 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 916.
107 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126-27.
108 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913-14.
109 See id. at 921-22; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
11o See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
845 (2001) (stating that Brown & Williamson reflects "a reverse presumption about congressional silence"); see also Michael Herz, Reading the Clean Air Act After Brown & Williamson, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,151, 10,155 (2001) ("Chevron deference hinges on a policymaking delegation,
and while the requisite delegation can sometimes be found simply through Congress' use of
vague language, such an implicit delegation will be found only for minor, interstitial questions.").
111 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup.
CT. REV. 223, 224 (2000) (arguing that the Court's approach in Brown & Williamson can be
understood as narrowing the statute to avoid a nondelegation problem); Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, supra note 9. at 245 ("For those who are enthusiastic about the nondelegation doctrine,
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the Court might have sought to prevent Congress from relinquishing
power too easily, through mere statutory ambiguity. 1 2 Similarly,
some have contended that the Court might be understood to pursue
an anti-aggrandizement principle. 1 3 It might have sought to prevent
agencies from assuming power too easily, exploiting mere statutory
ambiguity.1 4 Agencies, inclined to pursue their missions
overzealously, might interpret their authority without regard to the
11 5
limits that Congress intended to set.
But these explanations are at once plausible and unhelpful. Even
if the "extraordinary" question approach serves nondelegation or
anti-aggrandizement purposes, those purposes do not explain why the
Court singled out these particular questions. Thus, the nondelegation
or anti-aggrandizement explanations are really defenses for the results
in the cases-ones with which scholars have both agreed and disagreed.1 6 But they leave unexplained what about the particular interpretations made them so "extraordinary." We must infer a more
complete justification from the specific facts of the cases.
The facts reveal two potentially distinctive features. First, both
cases involved social rather than purely technical matters." 7 Though
important, this feature is not enough to distinguish the questions from
other cases where the Court has provided Chevron deference to
agency interpretations. Any policy might involve a social matter. The
issue of regulating carbon dioxide emissions and climate change, for
example, is largely a technical issue with profound social, economic,
this background principle [from Brown & Williamson] will have considerable appeal, above all
because it requires Congress, rather than agencies, to decide critical questions of policy ....");
see also Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239,
1244 (2002) (arguing that the Court's approach in Brown & Williamson can be understood as
reasserting the judiciary's role in statutory construction, Chevron notwithstanding).
112 See Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine,supra note 111, at 271.
113 See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 203, 250-62 (2004) (arguing that the Court's approach in Brown &
Williamson can be understood as invalidating an interpretation that would have expanded the
statute to advance the agency's self-interest).
114 See id. at 261.
115 See id.
116 See, e.g., Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 111, at 261-67 (arguing that
the nondelegation principle evident in Brown & Williamson does not best serve congressional
intent); Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 9, at 246 (arguing that a principle that seeks to
prevent agencies from expanding their own authority would introduce "an unhealthy status quo
bias into administrative law").
117 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 921-22 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2001).
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and political consequences." 8 The same might be said for auto safety
regulation: the public often cares deeply about the choice of safety
standards that the Department of Transportation mandates, and certainly the regulations that affect the domestic auto industry affect the
national economy. 1 9 We need more information to know why the
Court distinguishes certain social policies from others for purposes of
judicial deference.
Second, the questions extended the reach of the agency's authority. 120 Yet even this refinement, if necessary, still does not provide a
sufficient explanation. Many questions that arise under regulatory
statutes have some bearing on an agency's jurisdiction. As Justice
Scalia has remarked, there is "no discernable line between an agency's
exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority," and "[v]irtually any administrative action can be
characterized as either the one or the other, depending upon how generally one wishes to describe the 'authority.'- 121 The jurisdictional nature of the questions, standing alone, does not distinguish the cases.
Rather, understanding the Court's approach requires additional analysis into the underlying reasons for calling some, but not all, of these
borderline questions "extraordinary."
To determine what made these questions more significant than
others, we might fold in additional considerations from the cases. In
Brown & Williamson, the Court said that later-enacted statutes con122
cerning tobacco cut against the delegation of authority to the FDA.
In Gonzales, the Court said that the importance of the question, as
indicated by the "earnest and profound debate about the morality,

legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide ,123 made the
delegation "all the more suspect. 1 24 Thus, the questions were significant based on the current legal or social context. Without knowing
this background information, the questions look rather ordinary.
118 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
119 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 39 (1983).
120 See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron's Domain, supra note 110, at 845 (stating that "Brown
& Williamson adopted the functional equivalent of an exception to Chevron deference in cases
that involve ambiguities about the scope of an agency's jurisdiction").
121 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
122 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-61.
123

Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 921 (2006) (quotation omitted).

124

Id.
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This information is not merely useful in identifying the questions
that the Court has removed from Chevron's domain. It also points to
a particular understanding of the Court's decisions. More specifically,
the legal and social contexts show with greater precision the reason
that the Court rejected the agency interpretations, despite strong arguments that the executive branch was accountable for the agency
actions.
B.

The Relevance of the Legal and Social Contexts

Examination of the current legal and social contexts in each case
reveals that the administrations were acting against a certain backdrop
and in a certain way. In Brown & Williamson, the administration,
though visibly assuming responsibility for tobacco policy, disregarded
the likely preferences of Congress on the issue. 125 Congress acquiesced in the FDA's prior refusal to assert jurisdiction and conferred
on other agencies only limited power to regulate the advertising or
marketing of tobacco products. 26 Congress, however, never went as
far as the administration did to regulate the sale and distribution of
those products. 127 Nevertheless, the administration argued that facts
had changed sufficiently to bring tobacco products within the ambit of
the statute.12 8 Specifically, information had come to light that manufacturers manipulated the nicotine content of cigarettes such that they
intended cigarettes to have their physiological affects. 2 9 But the bigger problem simply was that the political facts had not changed: despite factual developments in understanding the effects of nicotine,
Congress had not retreated from its likely preference against FDA ju30
risdiction that it had revealed through later statutes.
In Gonzales, the administration took a position on an issue subject to public debate essentially by fiat. 3 1 The Attorney General
picked sides for the public without involving or even ascertaining the
views of the public. 32 But this was exactly the sort of controversial
issue on which the people themselves might have registered their preferences at the federal level, if given the opportunity. For example, the
FDA undertook notice and comment for its interpretation in Brown &
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-61.
See id. at 137-39.
See id.
See id. at 127.
See id.
See id. at 137-39.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006).
See id. at 911 (discussing the issuance of the Interpretive Rule).
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Williamson, and it received over 700,000 submissions on its proposed
rule-more than it ever had on any previous issue. 33 Furthermore, in
Gonzales, the Attorney General claimed power that inhibited further
discussion in the states. Oregon had legalized physician-assisted suicide, providing a source of learning not only for its own citizens but
also for the entire country. The Bush administration took a position
that hindered the operation of this law without consulting Oregon or
even anyone outside the Department of Justice.13 4 Finally, the administration asserted authority that, if vested in any federal agency, belonged to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 135 The
administration thus demonstrated disregard for the distribution of authority within the executive branch, a distribution that could be traced
back to Congress itself.
Both cigarettes and assisted suicide, then, were the subjects of
continuing public debate and evolving popular views. The difference
between Brown & Williamson and Gonzales lies in the extent of the
evidence supporting popular (or congressional) preferences on these
controversial topics. But the cases are united by a similar perception
that strong popular preferences existed that were at odds with the administration's decision-or at least that the administration had made
no effort to determine those preferences and acted in a way that was
insensitive to the legal and social contexts of the issues.
C.

The Concern for Accountability

In both cases, the administrations were not entitled to deference
although they had taken responsibility for the policies. One way to
explain why is that the agency's conduct was arbitrary, making electoral accountability insufficient and uncertain to deter or remedy it. The
conduct was not arbitrary in the sense that it necessarily was irrational
from a strategic standpoint. Indeed, the administrations may have
taken such actions to further their agendas or please their party loyalists. But the Court's decisions demonstrate that no administration is
entitled to disregard Congress's likely preferences or fence out popular consideration of contested issues, no matter the reason. Rather,
the Court imposed upon the administration a broader obligation: it
must function as part of the larger government and must serve the
public, especially when addressing significant social issues.136
133
134
135
136

See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126-27.
See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913-14.
See id.
Einer Elhauge has defended the result in Brown & Williamson, arguing that the Court
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Few would dispute that the President should act in a representative and responsive fashion. In the administrative state, a condition of
delegating regulatory authority is that agencies will ensure that such
regulatory authority is exercised in a manner that serves the interests
of all and not just some. 137 This is why presidential control of regulatory policy has such strong appeal to politicians and scholars.1 38 The
President offers the administrative state the legitimacy it long has
lacked. If presidents rather than unelected bureaucrats or judges assume responsibility for regulatory policy, there is less worry about
broad delegation. 139 More specifically, presidential control means that
there will be less worry about whether or to what extent regulatory
policy actually reflects the will of the people or the preferences of
their chosen representatives.
Although many people may assume that the President faithfully
discharges his obligation to the public, this may not always be true.
Some scholars assume that the President is representative of and rewas giving effect to current enactable congressional preferences, as it should when reviewing
agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions. Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2148 (2002) (arguing that the "requirement that the
agency make a 'reasonable policy choice' given competing political interests ... suggests courts
should deny deference if, even though not openly admitted by the agency, its interpretations
plainly conflict with current enactable policy preferences"). This Article's argument is not
grounded on a theory of statutory construction that directs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to implement current enactable congressional preferences. Instead, the goal is to
recognize that courts should prevent administrations from issuing interpretations in an arbitrary
or undemocratic manner on the basis of the administration's own preferences without regard to
broader popular (including congressional) interests. The argument is closer to one calling on
courts to balance executive and legislative branch preferences. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 46 (1994) (noting that
the Court "can be expected to fragment (often contentiously) if Congress and the President take
opposing sides on a separation-of-powers issue"); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the NationalistPresident and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1266 (2006) (describing Brown &
Williamson as consistent with the view that "the president's mandate is essentially on par with
that of Congress").
137 See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 152 (1997); Kagan, supra
note 1, at 2331; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 477 (1989).
138 See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive.,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58-70 (1995) (endorsing presidential control of agency decision making
because it promotes accountability); Kagan, supra note 1, at 2331-46 (same); Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 1, at 105-06 (arguing that presidential control of agency decision making increases
political accountability); Mashaw, supra note 1, at 95 (same); Pierce, supra note 1, at 1239,
1251-54 (arguing that the Constitution is premised on the belief that government should act as
an agent for the people).
139 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 137, at 477 (arguing that "[c]ourts should
construe statutes so that those who are politically accountable and highly visible will make regulatory decisions").
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sponsive to popular preferences by virtue of the same general features
that make the President accountable: the President is the one official
elected by and beholden to a national constituency. 140 Because of
these attributes, many people assume that the President will ensure
that the executive branch fills statutory gaps and make regulatory policy in a public-regarding fashion. 141 This assumption is sufficient to
legitimate regulatory policy and support judicial deference in the large
run of cases. That is, political accountability is ordinarily sufficient for
judicial deference.
But if political accountability is to carry the weight of the administrative state on its shoulders, then scholars should be prepared to
recognize that accountability must entail more than the requirement
that the President periodically stand for election. Electoral accountability is an important but often thin check when viewed in connection
with particular regulatory policies, because voters usually elect officials based on particularly salient policy issues, such as war or terrorism, as well as the general ideology of the candidates.142 Thus, there is
no guarantee that the incumbent President will reflect the will of the
people on particular policies simply by virtue of an electoral mandate,
or respond to the will of the people for fear of an electoral check.
Political accountability, to constitute a meaningful and effective constraint on executive branch action, must entail a more continuous
commitment to the principles of good government. Put differently,
political accountability must contain a functional component as well as
a formal one.
Cases like Brown & Williamson and Gonzales demonstrate that
the Court sometimes encounters accountability danger signals-signals that the administration has acted without regard to its continuous
commitment of accountable government. First, the Court may gather
evidence from the legal and social contexts that Congress or the public
disfavors the administration's resolution, either in terms of substance
140

See MASHAW, supra note 137, at 152.

See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2336 ("Take the President out of the equation and what
remains are individuals and entities with a far more tenuous connection to national majoritarian
preferences and interests: administrative officials selected by the President himself; staff of the
permanent bureaucracy; leaders of interest groups, which whether labeled 'special' or 'public'
represent select and often small constituencies; and members of congressional committees and
subcommittees almost guarantees by their composition and associated incentive structure to be
unrepresentative of national interests.").
142 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
a New PresidentArrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 617-19 (2003) (describing reasons why election
does not ensure that the President will reflect popular preferences on specific issues).
141

HeinOnline -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 782 2006-2007

Deference and Democracy

2007]

or procedure. One inference when the administration ignores congressional or popular preferences is that it is serving the interests of
favored constituencies. Serving narrow groups at public expense is
the hallmark of arbitrary government. But, even if we grant that serving narrow groups is a reality of our government, then it is unclear
why the President's favored groups ought to have a systematic advantage over others, or why we ought to call such favoritism "accountability" just because the President is involved.
Second, the Court may gather evidence from the statute, whether
as enacted or as elaborated through subsequent legislation, that other
agencies within the executive branch are the proper repository of the
regulatory authority at issue. For example, if any entity was to regulate tobacco products, it was not the FDA. 143 Rather, other agencies
had jurisdiction. 1"4 Those agencies possessed substantially more limited powers than the FDA to regulate the advertising and labeling of
tobacco products rather than to restrict (or even ban) the sale and
marketing of such products. 145 Similarly, if any agency was to regulate
medical practices such as physician-assisted suicide, it was the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), not the Attorney General. 46 Although the statutes on their faces arguably were vague
enough to permit a contrary interpretation, allowing the FDA and the
Attorney General to assert jurisdiction over the issues, the very assertion of authority suggested that the executive branch was insensitive
to its own internal separation of powers. Such separation of powers
might inhibit arbitrary action by preventing narrow groups (or the
President himself) from turning to agencies with strong powers or lax
procedures, particularly with respect to controversial social issues.
Finally, the very visibility of a policy and the assumption of responsibility may, counterintuitively, suggest to the Court that the administration acted for opportunistic rather than public-regarding
reasons. The Bush administration's physician-assisted suicide policy
raised this concern because the practice, like abortion, has strong
moral and religious dimensions. 147 Perhaps the President wanted to
claim credit for the policy to solidify a voter base that has disproportionate political power, knowing that those who oppose the policy
have limited recourse. The losers then would have to obtain the sup143
144
145
146
147

See
See
See
See
See

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137-39 (2000).
id.
id.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 924 (2006).
id. at 921-22.
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port of a supermajority of Congress to repeal the policy, assuming a
presidential veto. Or the opponents of the administration's policy
must await electoral recourse, at which time the electorate might prefer to vote on a basis other than that individual policy. It is possible to
think that these are simply the risks and costs of democracy; but to
trumpet this result as an exalted form of accountability seems problematic. If accountability is to serve as the key to agency legitimacy
then it is not unreasonable to expect representation and responsiveness, not just credit-claiming and blame-shifting.
Of course, these accountability danger signals are not always accurate; they are proxies for problematic executive branch motives.
An administration may have perfectly valid motives for departing
from popular preferences in a particularly visible way. 148 For example,
an administration may believe that the policy is the most effective or
efficient means of solving a social problem. It may believe that the
policy breaks the hold of narrow groups on Congress, or that the policy overcomes cognitive biases or generally reduces harmful public behavior. The administration may also believe that the policy is morally
superior or required. Indeed, the Clinton administration's tobacco
policy possessed many of these qualities. Tobacco manufacturers may
have great influence on members of Congress, and citizens have suffered health effects from which they may be unable to protect themselves.1 49 Children and adolescents, in particular, are vulnerable to the
pressures of smoking, and thereafter become addicted to these cancer150
causing products.
This analysis might suggest that any exception to Chevron deference ought to be nuanced, triggered by executive branch motives
rather than proxies such as contrary congressional or popular preferences. But, we might recognize, this cure is worse than the disease.
For one thing, requiring judges to read an administrator's (and the
President's) mind would erode separation of powers principles.151 For
another, the approach would impose practical difficulties. Any ad148 See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2340-41 (arguing that presidential involvement in agency
decision making may energize the administrative state).
149 See Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the
United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 13 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
2001) ("The tobacco industry is large, extremely profitable, and politically well organized. It can
and does contribute lavishly to the political campaigns of individual legislators and parties.").
150 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 128.
151 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (stating
that "inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decision makers is usually to be
avoided").
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ministration can claim that it is aiming to achieve public goals, and the
facts required to substantiate or refute that claim are difficult to obtain. The Court cannot ensure that a particular policy actually reflects
leadership in a way that might negate the concern that the administration is operating only in consideration of its own interests. Thus, any
rule will be under- or overinclusive. Perhaps, therefore, the Court
simply chose the overinclusive rule.
If so, this rule is no different from many other rules in our democratic structure. The Constitution often demands broad assurances
against arbitrary action or of broadly majoritarian action. For example, the requirements of bicameralism and presentment may be understood to serve this function, requiring narrow interest groups to secure
broader agreement before they may procure a law. 152 Against this
backdrop, a one-house legislative veto could not stand due to the fear
that it could provide interest groups with an easy method of reversing
agency action and therefore might facilitate government by faction,
even though this may not be the result in every case. 153 Indeed, a onehouse veto might even inhibit government tyranny in certain cases,
preventing the executive branch from accumulating too much authority. 154 Nevertheless, the Court, lacking a practical way to distinguish
between harmful and beneficial uses of a one-house veto, chose overprotection rather than underprotection. 155 This is a legitimate and justifiable choice, even if not the only one.
The exception to Chevron deference in cases like Brown & Williamson and Gonzales may be judged in this light. The Court's decisions might do more than necessary to prevent factional influences
from dictating policy, and it may thereby frustrate White House leadership in particular cases. But it does so in pursuit of assurances that
transcend particular policies or particular presidents. This approach
152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against
Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHM.-KENr L. REV. 987, 1017-18 (1997) (arguing that the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment ensure that any law enacted receives a high degree of political support).
153 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-49, 958-59 (1983); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
519-23 (2003) (arguing that the legislative veto may facilitate faction).
154 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article 1, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 542-43 (1992) (arguing that the legislative veto restores the balance of power between
Congress and the President); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 187-90 (1994) (contending that given the increase in presidential power, the legislative veto restores checks and balances).
155 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51, 956 (invalidating the legislative veto as a violation of

the requirements of bicameralism and presentment).
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recognizes that the President and his senior officials, in attending to
the details of regulatory statutes, must honor the power of the Oval
Office and not simply disregard the views of the other political branch
or the people themselves.
D.

The Relationship to CongressionalIntent

How might we relate this approach, which is based on general
democratic values, to congressional intent? After all, the Court is in-

terpreting statutes. 156 In answering, we might resist the question, acknowledging that when Congress creates broad statutes, it may have

no intent on certain issues-neither on the substance of particular policies nor on the allocation of interpretive authority. Indeed, many
scholars believe that presumptions of congressional intent are simply
judicially created proxies or fictions. 157 That is, Chevron is simply a

rule premised on the Court's judgment concerning the best allocation
of interpretive authority in the face of statutory ambiguity.1 58 This explanation seems to fit here because the problem in cases like Brown &
Williamson and Gonzales was not whether Congress had delegated
authority but how the administration had exercised authority
thereafter.
If so, these cases might tell us something significant about the
meaning of Chevron itself. First, Chevron might be premised on substantive values rather than congressional intent. In the wake of Mead,
scholars have begun to claim with increased confidence that Chevron
turns on congressional intent or delegation. 159 But Brown & Williamson and Gonzales might suggest otherwise. Although Chevron might
156 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(2001) ("In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as Congress's faithful agents."); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990)
("Traditional democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the
faithful agent of the legislature's intent.").
157 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 11, at 234 (arguing that the presumptions of congressional intent are "proxies"); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 103, at 689 (agreeing with the view
of some Justices and commentators who have recognized that the presumption of congressional
intent underlying Chevron is a "fiction"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 110, at 871-72 (noting
that the presumption of congressional intent underlying Chevron deference "has been described
by even its strongest defender [Justice Scalia] as 'fictional"').
158 See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2638-39 (2003)
(arguing that Chevron is premised on judicially determined values).
159 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 110, at 836 (arguing that Chevron is premised on
congressional intent); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 587 (2005)
(same); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (arguing that Congress once under-
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be premised on judicially recognized values, including formal account-

ability and expertise, it may not be limited to those values. Rather,

160
Chevron might also include both procedural regularity, as in Mead,
and functional accountability, as in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales. To the extent that these judicially recognized values make any use
of congressional intent, it is the intent or preferences of the prevailing

Congress, not the enacting one.
Second, Chevron's various steps have begun to blur together with
increasing frequency, making little practical difference.161 Brown &
Williamson and Gonzales might be read together to suggest that the
Court imposes as a condition of deference that an agency not only
possess delegated authority, but also that the agency exercise such authority in a democratically "reasonable" fashion. In Brown & Williamson, the Court attended to the agency action at Step One, in part
based on an assessment of current events, 162 even though the FDCA
may have been ambiguous-notwithstanding the Court's interpretive
gymnastics. 63 In Gonzales, the Court attended to the agency action at
so-called Step Zero, based on an assessment of current events. 164 Furthermore, the Court likely could have addressed the agency actions in
both cases under Step Two, which incorporates notions of reasonableness, at least technocratic reasonableness. 65 There is an analogy here.
No court would uphold an agency interpretation that considers only
half of the technical facts; 166 why should the result be any different
when an agency interpretation considers only half of the political facts,
stood statutory grants of lawmaking authority to confer on agencies authority to act with the
force of law, but recognizing that this convention is now lost).
160 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1485 (2005) (arguing that under Mead, "courts frequently must infer
congressional delegation from agency practice").
161 Cf Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 103, at 697-98 (noting that it may be cognitively
difficult for judges to separate these steps).
162

See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).

Scholars have argued that the FDCA was ambiguous, and that the Court went to great
lengths to conclude otherwise. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
DUKE L.J. 1215, 1257 (2001); Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 223-24 (2000).
163

164

See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006).

See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
1005-07 (2007) (demonstrating that Chevron Step Two incorporates the requirement of reasoned decision making).
166 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983) (remanding agency rule rescission for dismissing too quickly the data
concerning the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts).
165
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that is, the executive side but not the congressional or public side? 167
These cases might prompt us to recognize that Chevron is not as com-

partmentalized as the Court or commentators may assume. Chevron
often does not provide a mechanical framework as much as a set of

factors for considering interpretive problems in the regulatory state.
For those who prefer a link to congressional intent, there are explanations for the decisions in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales that
are no less plausible than the explanations relating other decisions to

congressional intent. For example, we might rely on the "extraordinary" question rationale, as the Court did.1 68 Of course, this is admittedly awkward, as it relies on imputing back to Congress information
that it could not envision when enacting the statutes. 169 Thus, we are

forced to say that Congress sometimes intends to delegate authority
and sometimes it does not, depending on a set of future facts that
make a question extraordinary. We nevertheless might embrace such
170
a contextual or dynamic approach to statutory construction.
Indeed, we might attribute to Congress the intent that agencies

interpret statutes in light of current congressional preferences. 171 Perhaps Congress even intends agencies to refrain from taking positions
on issues that are the subject of public debate so that Congress itself

may participate in any federal resolution. Or perhaps Congress seeks
167 A possible difference is that the Court in both Brown & Williamson and Gonzales invalidated the agency interpretations, see supra Part I, rather than remanding those interpretations
to the agency for reconsideration, as Step Two envisions. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392, 397 (1999) (remanding an unreasonable rule to the agency for reconsideration). Some interpretations are not susceptible to agency repair on remand, such as those that
extend the reach of the statute to a particular product or conduct. Either the interpretation is
permissible or it is not.
168 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 921; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159 (2000).
169 See William W. Buzbee, The One-CongressFiction in Statutory Construction, 149 U. PA.

L. REV. 171, 194-98 (2000) (arguing that the Court in Brown & Williamson, when consulting
later-enacted statutes to interpret an earlier one, presumed that a single Congress produces
legislation).
170 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132 ("The meaning-or ambiguity-of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context."). On dynamic statutory
construction, see generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH.
L. REV. 20, 56-61 (1988), articulating a theory under which courts update statutes based on
current legal and social context, and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480-81, 1484 (1987), articulating the same theory.
171 See Elhauge, supra note 136, at 2039 (arguing that members of Congress, past and present, would prefer judicial interpretations of statutes in a manner that tracks the current Congress's preferences); Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static-The Case of the APA, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 767, 801 (2005) (arguing that later-enacted statutes sometimes indicate
the current preferences of Congress).
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to prevent shifts on such issues to avert sudden changes triggered by
72
the election of a new administration.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend any particular
theory. However we explain what the Court is doing as a matter of
statutory construction, the Court's approach is still coherent, though
inconsistent with the notion of political accountability as commonly
understood. 173 More specifically, the Court is determining that administrations do not meet the general conditions for judicial deference
when they pursue their own agendas in disregard of broader governmental or public interests.
III. Other Examples
If the Court really is following a coherent approach in distinguishing instances of agency action warranting less deference from
those warranting more, we might expect to see it elsewhere. Of
course, we might not expect to see it very often if the trigger for
nondeferential review is the presence of circumstances that are truly
extraordinary. We might think that administrations do not often use
broad statutes to reach issues removed from their core responsibilities, intruding into matters of public concern when doing so goes
against likely congressional preferences or dampens public deliberation. Thus, the Court rarely should find that an administration has
acted undemocratically. This infrequency does not diminish the importance of the message that the cases convey to the executive branch
or suggest that there is no trend afoot. But it does suggest that the
approach is limited in an important respect. That is, the Court has not
run amok, invalidating executive branch policies without cause. Al172 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1049-57, 1065-66
(2006) (constructing a model to demonstrate that courts are more likely to produce decisions in
conformity with the notion of stare decisis, and that Congress might seek this approach where
consistency matters, such as with issues concerning the scope of agency authority); see also David
L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941-56
(1992) (arguing that courts should promote continuity and that agencies themselves have an
obligation to observe continuity); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1430 (2005) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes so at to promote
stability and that Chevron runs counter to this goal).
173 Cf Armstrong, supra note 113, at 262 (speculating whether the approach in Brown &
Williamson reflected the emergence of new principle or "a ticket good for this train, and this
train only") (internal citation omitted); Molot, supra note 111, at 1325 (arguing that the Court in
Brown & Williamson "focused so much on finding the right answer in the case at hand that it
overlooked its responsibility for maintaining a coherent doctrine of judicial review across
cases").
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though both Brown & Williamson and Gonzales are susceptible to a
political critique-that the conservative Justices voted to invalidate
the policy of a liberal administration, and the liberal Justices voted to
invalidate the policy of a conservative administration-we simply do
not see extreme cases often enough to suggest that the Court is driven
by agenda or ideology.
Nevertheless, we might expect to see some other cases beyond
those already discussed. This Part considers two such cases. The cases
are not identical to Brown & Williamson or Gonzales any more than
those cases are identical to each other. This Part merely claims that
all of the cases reflect a similar sentiment and makes clear why Chevron does not reflect that sentiment.
A.

Bob Jones

The focus on democratically unreasonable action connects Brown
& Williamson and Gonzales to an earlier case, Bob Jones University v.
United States,1 74 in which the Court held that the administration had
disregarded likely congressional preferences-indeed, likely preferences of the entire federal government-on a matter of great social
and political concern. 175 In response to a court order, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") determined that a racially discriminatory
educational institution was not a "charitable" institution entitled to
tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code.176 The Reagan
administration resisted this interpretation of the statute.1 77 But the
executive branch was the only part of the federal government to do so;
judicial decisions, previous executive orders, and congressional actions
78
all reflected consensus against race discrimination in education.
Under the circumstances, the Court stated that "it would be anomalous for the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches to reach
conclusions that add up to a firm public policy on racial discrimination, and at the same time have the IRS blissfully ignore what all three
branches of the Federal Government had declared. 1 1 79 That is, the
administration chose a position opposite to the one on which other
institutions of the federal government had reached consensus.

175

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Id. at 585, 595-96, 598.

176

Id. at 578-79 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000)).

177

Id. at 585 n.9.
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 598.

174

178
179
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Bob Jones is different from Brown & Williamson and Gonzales in
a material respect. In Bob Jones, the Court merely told the administration that it could not be the lone holdout. Such conduct was the
epitome of unreasonable or arbitrary action because it seemed to lack
any public-regarding explanation. But this difference only underscores the broad nature of the principle gleaned from Brown & Williamson and Gonzales. In those cases, the Court suggested that even
pioneering conduct may be problematic. The administrations in those
cases may have been attempting to move the country forward by using
broad mandates to solve what they perceived to be social problems,
restricting tobacco products and physician-assisted suicide. 180 The
Court nevertheless withheld deference,' 18 suggesting that the direction
of the change is irrelevant or simply too subjective a basis on which to
ground a distinction. Whether regressive or progressive, the administrations were not functioning as part of the broader government or as
a representative of the popular will, which was enough to suggest that
judicial deference was inappropriate.
B.

Rust v. Sullivan

The focus on democratically unreasonable action also provides an
explanation for the decision in Rust v. Sullivan.182 There, the approach actually worked in favor of the agency.
The Secretary of HHS under the George H.W. Bush administration had issued abortion-related speech restrictions. 1 83 Title X of the
Public Health Services Act authorizes grants to public and nonprofit
private entities that offer family planning services, provided that
"[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used
in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."' 184 HHS
interpreted "family planning" to require a ban on abortion counseling,
referral, or advocacy. 8 5 In this way, it extended its jurisdiction from
administering funds to regulating speech on a matter of profound public concern, much as the agencies had done in Brown & Williamson
and Gonzales.
180 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 921 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
181 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 921; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.

182 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
183

Id. at 177-78.

184

Id. at 178.

185

Id. at 179.
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The Court found that the statute was ambiguous and that the regulations were worthy of deference.18 6 The Court noted that HHS jus-

tified the regulations as necessary to provide guidance on the
distinction between eligible and ineligible Title X programs. 187 Furthermore, the Court stated that HHS had determined that the regula-

tions were "supported by a shift in attitude against the elimination of
unborn children by abortion."' 188 That shift, of course, was reflected in
many state statutes regulating access to abortion. 189 Accordingly, the
Court held that "we must defer to the Secretary's permissible construction of the statute." 190 Specifically, the Court held that the
agency was entitled to judicial deference for using a statute to reach

new conduct in an area of great social and political concern, in part
because the interpretation, which was the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking, was in line with public attitudes. 191 Thus, the administration did not fence out the public but relied on its preferences
in interpreting the statute. Indeed, the Court made offensive rather
than defensive use of public sentiments in evaluating the
192
interpretation.
Justice Stevens dissented, contending that the Secretary lacked

authority under the statute to regulate abortion-related speech because of the constitutional questions the issue raised.193 Thus, he
stated that "[i]n a society that abhors censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value on the freedom to

communicate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority to
regulate conduct implicitly authorized the Executive to regulate
Id. at 184-88.
See id. at 188.
188 Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (2003) (requiring informed consent for a
minor to have an abortion); see also COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 50 (banning public funding for
abortion).
190 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 187.
191 See id.
192 Id. The Court rejected the argument that the regulations were not entitled to deference
because they raised a constitutional question. Id. at 190-91. Indeed, the Court sustained the
regulation against a First Amendment attack, holding that government had the right to control
the speech it chooses to fund. Id. at 196-200. The Court also rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge. Id. at 201-03. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that the Court should have invoked
the constitutional avoidance canon and that the speech restrictions violated the Constitution on
First and Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. at 204-20 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Justice Stevens
also dissented, as described in the text accompanying notes 193-96. Finally, Justice O'Connor
dissented, stating that she would interpret the statute to avoid serious constitutional questions.
Id. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186
187
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speech."'194 Interestingly, Justice Stevens did not question whether the
country really had experienced "a shift in attitude against the elimination of unborn children by abortion."' 195 Rather, he emphasized the
overriding concern for speech. 196 Of course, the argument did not
carry the day, perhaps because the executive branch had public attitudes and state laws on its side. But Justice Stevens's dissent is instructive for two reasons. First, it suggests that interpretations raising
constitutional questions further complicate the deference analysis.
There may be a conflict between two principles-one that counsels
deference because the interpretation has public support and another
that undercuts deference because the interpretation raises a constitutional question. Second, Justice Stevens's dissent signals a danger, addressed in detail below, that the Court may misconstrue popular (or
congressional) preferences for a purpose broader than it should. The
states that restricted access to abortion had not weighed in on the precise issue of abortion-related speech restrictions. As Justice Stevens
recognized, it is unclear whether the concern for preventing abortion
or the concern for protecting free speech would prevail when the two
conflict. Thus, the Court may have erred in suggesting that the Secretary acted with the support of the public.
Nevertheless, the generic point still remains. Setting aside the
constitutional complication, as the majority did, the case shows that
deference is particularly appropriate when an agency acts with the
support of the public. The administration not only has formal accountability on its side, but also has functional accountability as well.
D.

Chevron Distinguished

Chevron itself involved an agency interpretation with none of the
features that made the agency interpretations in Brown & Williamson
and Gonzales problematic. The new interpretation, from smokestack
to bubble, was not "extraordinary" in the sense that it reached a new
social problem. 197 Rather, it offered a new solution to a statutorily
recognized social problem: air pollution.198 Moreover, the new definition reconciled interests that the statute itself made relevant. 199 This is
true even if, as the lower court found, an emissions trading system was
194 Id. Justice Stevens also argued that even if the language was ambiguous, he would have
joined Justice O'Connor in construing it to avoid serious constitutional questions. Id. at 223.
195 Id. at 187 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857-59 (1984).

198

See id.

199 See id. at 865 ("Congress intended to accommodate both interests [pollution reduction
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not the best way to reduce air pollution and therefore was at odds
with the broad purposes of the statute.2 00 Thus, the best method to
reduce air pollution, whatever it was, undoubtedly was at the heart of
the statute.
Furthermore, the new definition was not extraordinary when
viewed in the larger political context. First, there was no evidence
that the administration precluded public consideration. Indeed, the
administration issued the interpretation through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, not by executive-branch fiat. 20 1 Although such a procedure was not sufficient for judicial deference in Brown & Williamson
because Congress still likely opposed the interpretation (and perhaps
is not necessary for judicial deference in other circumstances), a public
procedure may show that the administration has engaged the public,
as it arguably did in Rust v. Sullivan.
Second, there was no evidence that the administration issued the
new definition despite likely congressional resistance. If anything,
Congress supported the shift, as the interpretation was part of a
broader movement in regulatory law. 202 Other agencies, both executive branch and independent, began using economic or incentivebased strategies to solve existing problems. 20 3 For example, the FDA
and the Occupational Safety & Health Administration started employing information disclosure requirements rather than restrictions
to deter risky behavior. 2°4 Furthermore, Congress also started pursuing incentive-based approaches. It too began requiring information
disclosure and amended the Clean Air Act in 1990 explicitly to include an emissions trading system for acid deposition. 20 5 Thus, the
policy change, when viewed in context, was restricted neither to EPA
nor to the Reagan administration. It was widespread and collaborative, involving other agencies and Congress in an experiment that already had substantial support in economic circles.
and reasonable economic growth], but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by
these cases.").
200 See id. at 859 (noting that the lower court "interpreted the policies of the statute, however, to mandate the plantwide definition in programs designed to maintain clean air and to
forbid it in programs designed to improve air quality").
201 See id. at 858-59.
202 For accounts of air pollution regulation, see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILT. HASSLER, CLEAN COALDIRTY AIR (1981); A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS
(2000).
203 See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
295-98 (5th ed. 2002) (collecting examples).
204 See id. at 297.
205 See id. at 296.
LIAM

FOR CLEAN AIR
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IV.

The Limits

These cases together reveal that the approach reflected in Brown
& Williamson and Gonzales is limited. The Court invokes the approach only rarely, suggesting that, for the most part, it will not find
that administrations have acted undemocratically. Furthermore, when
the Court does invoke the approach, it does so in a way that recognizes the danger of judicial overreaching. Scholars criticize the exceptions to Chevron on many grounds, but one of the most concerning is
that courts may use the room to invalidate agency interpretations on
the basis of their own ideology or politics. 20 6 Under the approach reflected in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales, courts have leeway to
deprive the executive branch of interpretive authority by manipulating or mistaking the subsequent legislative history. For example, a
court might invalidate an agency interpretation for disregarding likely
congressional preferences, yet have read congressional silence for
more than it is worth. Or a court might invalidate an agency interpretation for taking a position that stems from public debate, yet might
overestimate the extent of the division in the country. It also might
refuse to give an administration credit where credit is due by refusing
to recognize that congressional acquiescence or public consensus supports the interpretation. But an examination of the cases suggests that
the Court demands a degree of substantiation that minimizes judicial
judgment.
It is important to note, however, that no set of limits can convert
a nuanced model of statutory construction into a bright line rule of
judicial deference against which Congress may legislate. Some have
argued that this purpose is the only way to justify Chevron and its
fiction about congressional intent.20 7 Adherents of this view will find
little comfort in this Part because it only makes the exception more
restrained and predictable.

206 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An EmpiricalInvestigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHi. L. REV. 823, 825-27 (2006); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the
Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2162-76 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717-19 (1997).
207 See Scalia, supra note 23, at 517 ("Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates.., will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by
a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.").
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Likely CongressionalPreferences

The limit that the Court imposes when consulting congressional
preferences is one of substantiation.2 0 8 Thus, the Court does not rely
on congressional silence alone. For example, in Brown & Williamson,
the Court noted that Congress had taken specific steps consistent with
the agency's prior position, having enacted six federal statutes.20 9 In
Bob Jones, the Court identified even more overwhelming evidence
from every branch of the federal government, undermining the
210
agency's prior position.
By contrast, the Court would have been on shaky ground if it had
relied on sources that are not considered to be reliable evidence of
governmental preferences. For example, the Court would have encountered trouble if it had attempted to verify Congress's refusal to
overturn the prior agency interpretation in Brown & Williamson with
letters from individual members of Congress, statements from individual members in connection with later-enacted statutes, or general presumptions about congressional preferences in a period of divided
government. Similarly, the Court in Bob Jones would have been less
sure if it had relied only on memos from the President or presidential
signing statements attached to other laws. But the Court relied on
none of these sources.
Could the Court in another case rely on less evidence, or must it
rely on overwhelming evidence to determine congressional preferences under this approach? One might imagine that quantity is
largely dependent on the context. Perhaps even a single concrete legislative action might be sufficient to corroborate congressional preferences if Congress would not be expected to manifest its preferences
through multiple sources, as it did in Brown & Williamson and Bob
Jones.

211

208 See Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static, supra note 171, at 768-69 (arguing that examining subsequent statutes to gain perspective on an earlier-enacted statute may assist courts in
distinguishing their preferences from those of Congress).
209 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137-38 (2000) (collecting
statutes).
210 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
211 Cf Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2231 (2006) (stating that "[aibsent such
overwhelming evidence of acquiescence [as was present in Bob Jones], we are loath to replace the
plain text and original understanding of a statute with an amended agency interpretation" (first
alteration and emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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B.

Division or Consensus in the Country

The Court also looks for substantiation of general public attitudes
toward a particular issue, whether those attitudes reflect division or
consensus. In Gonzales, Congress presumably knew that the public
was not settled on the issue of physician-assisted suicide when it acquiesced in the prior policy-indeed, anyone living in this country probably knows that the issue is a live controversy. In any event, the Court
did not rely on this presumption. Congress had not taken further
steps to substantiate such awareness, nor would we have expected it
to. It is fair to say that legislative silence, under these circumstances,
could not be distinguished from "Congress's failure to express any
212
opinion."
Instead, the Court relied on Oregon's action. 213 Oregon's law

demonstrated that the administration was moving in a direction opposite to a concrete constituency. Perhaps Oregon was an outlier, and
no state would follow. That certainly would be problematic if the
Court had found that the administration acted undemocratically by
ignoring popular consensus on physician-assisted suicide. But there
likely was no consensus among the people or the states on physicianassisted suicide, as there was among members of Congress regarding
tobacco products. Indeed, the Court did not rely on popular consensus. Rather, it found that the administration was insensitive to public
engagement on the issue, taking a position in the debate essentially by
fiat.21 4 Oregon's law was a concrete manifestation of such public en-

gagement. Furthermore, the administration's action inhibited other
states from enacting similar laws.
In Rust, the Court invoked public consensus rather than engagement.215 Many states had enacted statutes restricting access to abortion services, and the Court might have pointed to these statutes as
evidence of consensus supporting the administration's speech restrictions. But the case was more complicated, and actually contains a
cautionary note about the use of subsequent legislative history. The
states had not considered the precise issue of abortion gag rules in
enacting various other restrictions, and that issue raised free speech
concerns.

216

212

Id.

213

See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 912-13 (2006).
See id. at 921.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
See supra Part II.B.

214
215
216
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Moreover, Congress ultimately opposed the speech restrictions,
passing a bill to repeal them after the case was decided. 21 7 The Bush
administration, insistent on the speech restrictions, predictably vetoed
the bill.21 8 The rules remained in place until the Clinton administration took office. 219 Although this evidence was not available during
the litigation, it suggests that the Court and the administration may
have taken too broad a view of any shift in public attitude regarding
the precise issue of abortion-related speech restrictions. Perhaps the
public opposed such speech restrictions, and, in any event, perhaps
Congress, which ultimately determines the content of federal law, opposed them. At the same time, the case has a positive side, as it shows
that the Court was not overzealous in recognizing congressional resistance based on hearings or other expressions of interest short of an
enacted law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court may be driving at a rule of statutory construction that pursues a goal different from and counter to traditional
notions of political accountability. That rule asks whether the administration has acted undemocraticaly either by disregarding likely congressional preferences or public engagement on an issue of social
concern. We might understand this rule as an effort by the Court (or
at least the median Justices) to see the realization of congressional
intent. Or perhaps we might acknowledge that the rules in this area,
both Chevron and its exceptions, recognize judicially determined values more than we have previously acknowledged.
This Article's core contention is that Brown & Williamson and
Gonzales are best explained by reference to the obligations of the executive branch in our democratic structure. The administration is not
always entitled to deference when interpreting broad delegations to
achieve certain political goals, subject only to periodic electoral check.
Specifically, it is not entitled to deference when taking positions that,
though politically expedient, disregard Congress's views and the engagement of the people. To do so raises an inference that the administration is interested in representing only some of the people, not all of
the people.
217 See PETER
ed. 2003).
218 See id.
219 See id.
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This Article does not contend that we necessarily should embrace
the approach from Brown & Williamson and Gonzales. It has a more
modest goal. We ought to understand the circumstances in which the
Court has determined that political accountability is insufficient to
support judicial deference. Scholars, focused on remitting interpretive
authority to elected officials, may have rejected cases like Brown &
Williamson and Gonzales without appreciating fully the values that
they reflect. Once we understand why the Court may have intervened
in these cases, we must better articulate why abstractions about political accountability or concerns about judicial overreaching nevertheless should carry the day.

Postscript
On April 2, 2007, the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, 220 and
its reasoning closely tracks the theory that I have articulated in this
Article. The case involved the question of whether EPA has authority
under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles, and if so, whether the agency could decline to
regulate greenhouse gases simply based on its own policy considerations and its claim of "scientific uncertainty. ' 221 The case is another
example in which the Court found political accountability insufficient
for judicial deference. The Court withheld deference from an administration policy that disregarded obvious congressional preferences,
parallel to Brown & Williamson.222 Interestingly, the Bush administration understood the importance of Brown & Williamson and the
relevance of subsequent congressional action to a finding of agency
authority, but it analyzed the direction of that action and authority
exactly backwards.
The question in Massachusetts v. EPA was different from the ones
in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales v. Oregon223 because here the
agency had declined to assert jurisdiction under a statute that arguably
encompassed the regulatory subject, rather than asserting jurisdiction
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
Id. at 1451; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (requiring that EPA "shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class ... of new
motor vehicles .. .which [in EPA Administrator's] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare").
222 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60. In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court did not invalidate the policy but remanded to the agency. See Massachusetts v.
EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
223 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
220
221
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under a statute that arguably did not. 224 For this reason, the Court did

not treat the question as an "extraordinary" statutory extension, as it
had in the prior cases. But it did note, at the very outset of the opinion, that the question was extraordinary in the sense that it concerned
"the most pressing environmental challenge of our time"-namely,
global warming. 225 The Court went on to conclude that EPA may not
decline to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with presi-

dential priorities if doing so contravenes the "congressional design" of
226
the statute.

By "congressional design," the Court had in mind the same sorts
of considerations as in Brown & Williamson: not only the language of
the Clean Air Act 227 but also the "postenactment congressional actions and deliberations" surrounding that statute. 228 When Congress

enacted the Clean Air Act, "the study of climate change was in its
infancy. '229 But, the Court noted, as that study progressed, Congress
took concrete steps consistent with EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases.2 30 In particular, Congress enacted statutes to promote
"research to better understand climate change" and interagency coor-

dination on the issue. 231 The Court thus rejected EPA's argument that
the subsequent legislative context undercut its authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.2 32 Although Congress had considered but
failed to confer express authority on EPA, the Court found that such

congressional inaction "tells us nothing about what Congress meant"
when providing for climate change research and collaboration. 233 InSee Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1450.
Id. at 1446 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
226 Id. at 1462. The Court first determined that the plaintiffs-a group of states, local governments, and private organizations-had standing to bring the challenge. See id. at 1452-58.
The standing determination is significant for administrative law purposes and will no doubt generate considerable scholarly discussion.
227 Id. at 1460 (finding that the statute "[o]n its face ... embraces all airborne compounds
of whatever stripe" and further stating on this point that "[tihe statutory text forecloses EPA's
reading" and "[t]he statute is unambiguous").
228 Id.
229 Id. at 1447.
230 Id. at 1447-48.
231 Id. at 1460-61; see also id. at 1448 (describing the National Climate Program Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, § 3, 92 Stat. 601, 601, "which required the President to establish a
program to 'assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and maninduced climate processes and their implications,"' and the Global Climate Protection Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1407, 1408 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note
(2000)), which "directed EPA to propose to Congress a 'coordinated national policy on global
climate change.'").
232 Id. at 1460-61.
233 Id at 1460.
224
225
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deed, it found nothing in the subsequent context of the Clear Air Act
"remotely suggesting that Congress meant to curtail [EPA's] power to
2 34
treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants.
Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress had not parceled
lesser or exclusive authority in this area to other agencies, a factor
especially relevant in Gonzales.2 35 The Court rejected EPA's argument that the Department of Transportation was the right agency to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles, finding "no
reason to think that the two agencies cannot both administer their
obligations and yet avoid inconsistency. 2 36 Later in the opinion, the
Court noted that another agency, the State Department, also had interest in this issue, but that agency was relevant in a way that freed
EPA to regulate greenhouses gases, not the opposite.2 37 The Court
stated that "Congress authorized the State Department-not EPAto formulate United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate. '238 The Bush administration argued that EPA was prevented by foreign policy concerns from
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles. 239 The Court
disagreed, and noted, moreover, that EPA had not even consulted
with the State Department in declining to take action on climate
change.

240

In line with this reasoning, the Court rejected EPA's contention
that Brown & Williamson foreclosed EPA jurisdiction. 241 First, the
Court stated that the FDA's statutory construction in Brown & Williamson would have required a ban on tobacco products, a result that
"clashed with the common sense intuition that Congress never meant
to remove those products from circulation. 2 42 An interpretation of
the relevant portion of the Clean Air Act to include greenhouse gases
would not result in a ban of greenhouse gas emissions but only regula234

Id.

Id. at 1461-62; see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 924 (2006) (noting that the CSA
directs any medical judgments to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not the Attorney
General).
236 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
237 Id. at 1463.
235

238

Id.

Id. at 1451 (noting EPA argument that "unilateral EPA regulation of motor-vehicle
greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the President's ability to persuade key developing
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions").
240 Id. at 1463.
241 Id. at 1461.
242 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
239
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tion of such emissions, which is not "counterintuitive. '' 243 Second, the
Court observed that Brown & Williamson involved congressional enactments that implicitly accepted the FDA's repeated determination
that it lacked authority to regulate tobacco products, Whereas this
case involved no comparable congressional action that conflicts with
EPA authority. 244 If anything, Congress operated against the reverse
backdrop of EPA's consistent determination that it had authority to
245
regulate greenhouse gases.
Finding jurisdiction, the Court then determined that EPA had not
offered a sufficient basis for declining to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles. 246 It rejected the "laundry list" of factors that
EPA supplied, all of which concerned the President's desire to manage
climate issues as he saw fit.247 According to the Court, the statutory
language calls for an endangerment judgment-a determination
whether carbon dioxide "cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare. '248 None of the reasons that EPA offered, including a preference to adopt voluntary programs, negotiate with foreign nations, or
generally eschew any "inefficient, piecemeal approach," amounted "to
a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment." 249
As for whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate change,
the Court stated that EPA was not entitled simply to claim scientific
uncertainty.25 0 Rather, the agency must show that scientific uncertainty "is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming. '2 51 The Court found that EPA had failed to undertake such analysis.2 5 2 The Court might have gone further, frankly expressing its
doubt that EPA could show profound scientific uncertainty; in its
standing analysis, the Court noted the virtual consensus in the scientific community, as well as in the world community, that greenhouse
gases contribute to global warming.25 3 Thus, EPA's determination not
243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 1462.

247

Id.

248 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
249 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
250 Id.
251

Id.

252

Id.
Id. at 1455-56.

253
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to regulate defied both congressional preferences for EPA regulatory
authority and larger scientific and global consensus on climate change.
As a result, the determination not to regulate based on scientific analysis may be more difficult to sustain on remand than the Court acknowledged, 254 a point that Justice Scalia suggested in his dissent.255
The dissenters contested both the standing and merits holdings.
Chief Justice Roberts's dissent focused on standing, arguing for various reasons that "redress of grievances of the sort at issue here is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive, not the federal
courts. 2 56 Justice Scalia's dissent discussed the merits. He argued
that EPA's reasons for refusing to regulate were not proscribed by the
statute and therefore were entitled to Chevron deference.25 7 He also
found that EPA's conclusions as to scientific uncertainty were sufficiently explained.25 8 Finally, he argued that the statute itself was ambiguous as to whether carbon dioxide emissions were covered, and
therefore EPA was owed Chevron deference in making that
25 9
judgment.
The lineup-with the liberals in the majority and the conservatives in the dissent-is relevant because it makes the case susceptible
to the same critique as Brown & Williamson and Gonzales: that the
result turned on judicial ideology and not legal principle.2 60 But that
critique overlooks the critical and consistent position of Justice Kennedy. He was in the majority of each case, which makes the principle
of withholding deference when an agency acts undemocratically fragile but nonetheless robust for as long as the Court's personnel remains
consistent. The point is not to emphasize the vulnerability of the principle, however. It is rather to see that a principle exists among the
politics and to think about whether this principle ought to be defended, not merely explained, as I have done in this Article. We
should consider, in connection with the proper relationship between
deference and democracy in the administrative state, the appropriate
rules of administrative law.

254 Id. at 1463 (stating that EPA must do more than show "some residual uncertainty" as to
climate change).
255 Id. at 1474-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (laying out the scientific findings of EPA and stating that is difficult to know "what else the Court would like EPA to say").
256 Id. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
257 Id. at 1472 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 1474-75.
259 Id. at 1472-77.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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